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Abstract
It was shown in [WST08] that cryptographic primitives can be implemented based on the
assumption that quantum storage of qubits is noisy. In this work we analyze a protocol for the
universal task of oblivious transfer that can be implemented using quantum-key-distribution
(QKD) hardware in the practical setting where honest participants are unable to perform noise-
free operations. We derive trade-offs between the amount of storage noise, the amount of noise
in the operations performed by the honest participants and the security of oblivious transfer
which are greatly improved compared to the results in [WST08]. As an example, we show that
for the case of depolarizing noise in storage we can obtain secure oblivious transfer as long as
the quantum bit-error rate of the channel does not exceed 11% and the noise on the channel is
strictly less than the quantum storage noise. This is optimal for the protocol considered. Finally,
we show that our analysis easily carries over to quantum protocols for secure identification.
1 Introduction
The noisy-quantum-storage model [WST08] is based on the assumption that it is difficult to store
quantum states. Based on current practical and near-future technical limitations, we assume that
any state placed into quantum storage is affected by noise. At the same time the model assumes
that preparation, transmission and measurement of simple unentangled quantum states can be
performed with much lower levels of noise. The present-day technology of quantum key distribu-
tion with photonic qubits demonstrates this contrast between a relatively simple technology for
preparation/transmission/measurement versus a limited capability for quantum storage.
Almost all interesting cryptographic tasks are impossible to realize without any restrictions
on the participating players, neither classically nor with the help of quantum information, see
e.g. [Lo97, May96, LC96, LC97, May97]. It is therefore an important task to come up with a
cryptographic model which restricts the capabilities of adversarial players and in which these tasks
become feasible. It turns out that all such two-party protocols can be based on a simple primitive
called 1-2 Oblivious Transfer (1-2 OT) [Kil88, GV88], first introduced in [Wie83, Rab81, EGL85].
In 1-2 OT, the sender Alice starts off with two bit strings S0 and S1, and the receiver Bob holds
a choice bit C. The protocol allows Bob to retrieve SC in such a way that Alice does not learn
any information about C (thus, Bob cannot simply ask for SC). At the same time, Alice must be
ensured that Bob only learns SC , and no information about the other string SC (thus, Alice cannot
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Allowed QBR Secure 1-2 OT Secure Identification
PRL [WST08] None Yes No
Unpublished [WST07] 2.9% Yes No
This work
11% Yes Yes
(optimal)
Table 1: Summary of previous results and the results in this paper. The allowed quantum bit-error
rate (QBR) is the maximum effective error-rate on the actions of the honest parties below which
we can prove the security of the cryptographic scheme.
simply send him both S0 and S1). A 1-2 OT protocol is called unconditionally secure when neither
Alice nor Bob can break these conditions, even when given unlimited resources.
2 Results
In this work we focus on the setting where the honest parties are unable to perform perfect op-
erations and experience errors themselves, where we analyze individual-storage attacks. These
honest-party errors can be modeled as bit-errors on an effective channel connecting the honest
parties. In unpublished work, we have shown that for the case of depolarizing noise in storage,
security can be obtained if the actions of the honest parties are noisy but their error rate does not
exceed 2.9% [WST07]. This threshold is too low to be of any practical value. In particular, this
result left open the question whether security can be obtained in a real-life scenario.
Using a very different analysis, we are now able to show that in the setting of individual-storage
attacks 1-2 oblivious transfer and secure identification can be achieved in the noisy-storage model
with depolarizing storage noise, as long as the quantum bit-error rate of the channel does not exceed
11% and the noise on the channel is strictly less than the noise during quantum storage. This is
optimal for the protocol considered.
Our result is of great practical significance, since it paves the way to achieve security in a
real-life implementation. Our main new Theorems 4.2 and 6.1 relate the security of the 1-2 OT
protocol to an uncertainty lower bound on the conditional Shannon entropy. In order to prove
these theorems, we need to relate the Shannon entropy to the smooth min-entropy and establish
several new properties of the smooth min-entropy, see Section 3.2.1.
We evaluate the uncertainty lower bounds on the conditional Shannon entropy in the practically-
interesting case of depolarizing noise resulting in Theorems 5.1 and 6.2. From this analysis we obtain
the clear-cut result that, depending on the amount of storage noise, the adversary’s optimal storage
attack is to either store the incoming state as is, or to measure it immediately in one of the two
BB84 bases.
2.1 The Noisy-Quantum-Storage Model and Individual-Storage Attacks
The noisy-storage model assumes that any quantum state that is placed into quantum storage is
affected by some noise described by a quantum operation N . Practically, noise can arise as a result
of transferring the qubit onto a different physical carrier, for example the transfer of a photonic
qubit onto an atomic ensemble or atomic state. In addition, a quantum state will undergo noise
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once it has been transferred into ‘storage’ if such quantum memory is not 100% reliable.
In principle, one may like to prove security against an adversary that can perform any operation
on the incoming quantum states. Here however we analyze the restricted case where the adversary
Bob performs individual-storage attacks. More precisely, Bob’s actions are of the following form as
depicted in Figure 1.
1. Bob may choose to (partially) measure (a subset of) his qubits immediately upon reception
using an error-free product measurement, i.e., when he receives the jth qubit, he may apply
any measurement Pj of his choosing.
2. In addition, he can store each incoming qubit, or post-measurement state from a prior partial
measurement, separately and wait until he gets additional information from Alice (at Step 3
in Protocol 1). During storage, the jth qubit is thereby affected by some noise described
by a quantum operation Nj acting independently on each qubit. Note that such quantum
operation Nj could come about from encoding an incoming qubit into an error-correcting
code and decoding it right before receiving Alice’s additional information.
3. Once Bob obtains the additional information he may perform an arbitrary coherent measure-
ment M on his stored qubits and stored classical data.
We would like to note that we can also derive security if we would allow Bob to initially perform
any, non-product, destructive measurement on the incoming qubits. By destructive we mean that
there is no post-measurement quantum data left. The reason is that we have previously shown in
Lemma 2 in [WST08], that destructive product measurements are optimal for Bob if he is not al-
lowed to keep any post-measurement information. Hence this optimality of product measurements
reduces such more general destructive measurement model to our model of individual-storage at-
tacks. Measurements in present-day technology with single photon qubits in which photons are
detected, are in fact always destructive, hence our model includes many realistic attacks. Intu-
itively, using entangling operations between the incoming qubits should be of little help in either
extracting more information from these independent, uncorrelated, BB84 qubits or in better pre-
serving these qubits against noise when the noise is extremely low and more is lost than gained by
measuring some qubits right away and using part of the newly freed space to encode the remaining
qubits. Of course this remains to be proven (see also Conclusion). What can help is to entangle an
incoming qubit individually with ancilla qubits in order to store the incoming qubit in an encoded
or other more robust form. This attack is covered in our model as an effective noisy operation Nj
on incoming qubit j.
In the following, we use the quantum operation Si to denote the combined quantum operations
of Bob’s initial (partial) measurement and the noise.
2.2 Related work
Our model is closely related to the bounded-quantum-storage model, which assumes that the ad-
versary has a limited amount of quantum memory at his disposal [DFSS05, DFR+07]. Within this
‘bounded-quantum-storage model’ OT can be implemented securely as long as a dishonest receiver
Bob can store at most n/4−O(1) qubits coherently, where n is the number of qubits transmitted
from Alice to Bob. This approach assumes an explicit limit on the physical number of qubits (or
more precisely, the rank of the adversary’s quantum state). However, at present we do not know
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Figure 1: Individual-Storage Attacks
of any practical physical situation which enforces such a limit for quantum information. As was
pointed out in [Sch07, DFSS08], the original bounded-quantum-storage analysis applies in the case
of noise levels which are so large such that the dishonest player’s quantum storage has an effective
noise-free Hilbert space with dimension at most 2n/4. The advantage of our model is that we can
evaluate the security parameters of a protocol explicitly in terms of the strength of the noise, even
when the noise rate is very low.
Precursors of the idea of basing cryptographic security on storage-noise are already present
in [BBCS92], but no rigorous analysis was carried through in that paper. We furthermore note
that our security proof does not exploit the noise in the communication channel (which has been
done in the classical setting to achieve cryptographic tasks, see e.g. [CK88, CMW04, Cre´97]), but
is solely based on the fact that the dishonest receiver’s quantum storage is noisy. A model based on
classical noisy storage is akin to the setting of a classical noisy channel, if the operations are noisy,
or the classical bounded-storage model, both of which are difficult to enforce in practice. Another
technical limitation has been considered in [Sal98] where a bit-commitment scheme was shown
secure under the assumption that the dishonest committer can only measure a limited amount
of qubits coherently. Our analysis differs in that we can in fact allow any coherent destructive
measurement at the end of the protocol.
2.3 Outline
In Section 3, we introduce some notation and the necessary technical tools. In Section 4, we define
the security of 1-2 OT, present the protocol and prove its security in the case when honest players
do not experience noise. In Section 5 we then consider the example of depolarizing storage noise
explicitly. The lengthy proof of Theorem 5.1 can be found in Appendix B. In Section 6 we show
how to obtain security if the honest players are unable to perform perfect quantum operations.
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Finally, we point out in Section 7 how our analysis carries over to other protocols.
3 Preliminaries
We start by introducing the necessary definitions, tools and technical lemmas that we need in the
remainder of this text.
3.1 Basic Concepts
We use ∈R to denote the uniform random choice of an element from a set. We further use x|T to
denote the string x = x1, . . . , xn restricted to the bits indexed by the set T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. For a
binary random variable C, we denote by C the bit different from C.
Let B(H) denote the set of all bounded operators on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space H.
Let P(H) ⊂ B(H) denote the subset of positive semi-definite Hermitian operators on H, and let
S(H) ⊂ P(H) denote the subset of all quantum states on H, i.e. ρ ∈ S(H) iff ρ ∈ B(H) with ρ ≥ 0
and Tr(ρ) = 1. TrA : B(HAB)→ B(HB) is the partial trace over system A. We denote by idA the
identity operator on system A. Let |0〉+, |1〉+, |0〉× := (|0〉+ + |1〉+)/
√
2, |1〉× := (|0〉+ − |1〉+)/
√
2
denote the BB84-states corresponding to the encoding of a classical bit into the computational or
Hadamard basis, respectively.
Classical-Quantum States A cq-state ρXE is a state that is partly classical, partly quantum,
and can be written as
ρXE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE .
Here, X is a classical random variable distributed over the finite set X according to distribution
PX , {|x〉}x∈X is a set of orthonormal states and the register E is in state ρxE when X takes on value
x.
Distance measures The L1-norm of an operator A ∈ B(H) is defined as ‖A‖1 := Tr
√
A†A. The
fidelity between two quantum states ρ, σ is defined as F (ρ, σ) := ‖√ρ√σ‖1. For pure states it takes
on the easy form F (|φ〉〈φ|, |ψ〉〈ψ|) = |〈φ|ψ〉|. The related quantity C(ρ, σ) := √1− F 2(ρ, σ) is a
convenient distance measure on normalized states [GLN05]. It is invariant under purifications and
equals the trace distance for pure states, i.e. C(|ψ〉〈ψ|, |φ〉〈φ|) = √1− |〈ψ|φ〉|2 = 12‖|ψ〉〈ψ|−|φ〉〈φ|‖1.
Non-uniformity We can say that a quantum adversary has little information about X if the
distribution PX given his quantum state is close to uniform. Formally, this distance is quantified
by the non-uniformity of X given ρE =
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E defined as
d(X|E) := 1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ idX/|X | ⊗ ρE −∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE
∥∥∥∥∥
1
. (1)
Intuitively, d(X|E) ≤ ε means that the distribution of X is ε-close to uniform even given ρE , i.e.,
ρE gives hardly any information about X. A simple property of the non-uniformity which follows
from its definition is that it does not change given independent information. Formally,
d(X|E,D) = d(X|E) (2)
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for any cqq-state of the form ρXED = ρXE ⊗ ρD.
3.2 Entropic Quantities
Throughout this paper we use a number of entropic quantities. The binary-entropy function is
defined as h(p) := −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p), where log denotes the logarithm base 2 throughout
this paper. The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state ρ is given by
H(ρ) := −Tr(ρ log ρ) .
For a bipartite state ρAB ∈ S(HAB), we use the shorthand
H(A|B) := H(ρAB)−H(ρB)
to denote the conditional von Neumann entropy of the state ρAB given the quantum state ρB =
TrA(ρAB) ∈ S(HB). Of particular importance to us are the following quantities introduced by
Renner [Ren05]. Let ρAB ∈ S(HAB). Then the conditional min-entropy of ρAB relative to B is
defined by the following semi-definite program
H∞(A|B)ρ := − log min
σB∈P(HB)
ρAB≤idA⊗σB
Tr(σB) .
For a cq-state ρXE one can show [KRS09] that the conditional min-entropy is the (negative loga-
rithm of the) guessing probability 1
H∞(X|E)ρ = − log Pguess(X|E)ρ , (3)
where Pguess(X|E)ρ is defined as the maximum success probability of guessing X by measuring the
E-register of ρXE . Formally, for any (not necessarily normalized) cq-state ρXE , we define
Pguess(X|E)ρ := sup
{Mx}
∑
x
PX(x)Tr(MxρxE) ,
where the supremum ranges over all positive-operator valued measurements (POVMs) with mea-
surement elements {Mx}x∈X , i.e. Mx ≥ 0 and
∑
xMx = idE . If all information in E is classical, we
recover the fact that the classical min-entropy is the negative logarithm of the average maximum
guessing probability.
In our proofs we also need smooth versions of these entropic quantities. The idea is to no
longer consider the min-entropy of a fixed state ρAB, but take the supremum over the min-entropy
of states ρˆAB which are close to ρAB, and which may have considerably larger min-entropy. In a
cryptographic setting, we are often not interested in the min-entropy of a concrete state ρAB, but
in the maximal min-entropy we can get from states in the neighborhood of ρAB, i.e. deviating only
slightly from the real situation ρAB. These smooth quantities have some nice properties which are
needed in our security proof. For ε ≥ 0, the ε-smooth min-entropy of ρAB is given by
Hε∞ (A|B)ρ := sup
ρˆAB∈Kε(ρAB)
H∞(A|B)ρˆ ,
where Kε(ρAB) := {ρˆAB ∈ P(HAB) | C(ρAB, ρˆAB) ≤ ε and Tr(ρˆAB) ≤ 1)}. If the quantum states
ρ are clear from the context, we drop the subscript of the entropies.
1Such an “operational meaning” of conditional min-entropy can also be formulated for general qq-states [KRS09].
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3.2.1 Properties of The Conditional Smooth Min-Entropy
In our security analysis we make use of the following properties of smooth min-entropy. First, we
need the chain rule whose simple proof can be found in Appendix A.1:
Lemma 3.1 (Chain Rule) For any ccq-state ρXY E ∈ S(HXY E) and for all ε ≥ 0, it holds that
Hε∞ (X|Y E) ≥ Hε∞ (XY |E)− log |Y|,
where |Y| is the alphabet size of the random variable Y .
Secondly, we prove the additivity of the smooth conditional min-entropy (see Appendix A.2):
Lemma 3.2 (Additivity) Let ρAB and ρA′B′ be two independent qq-states. For ε ≥ 0, it holds
that
Hε
2
∞
(
AA′|BB′)
ρ
≤ Hε∞ (A|B) + Hε∞
(
A′|B′) .
Thirdly, adding a classical register can only increase the smooth min-entropy (see Appendix A.3):
Lemma 3.3 (Monotonicity) For a ccq-state ρXY E and for all ε ≥ 0, it holds that
Hε∞ (XY |E) ≥ Hε∞ (Y |E) .
At last, we deduce a lower bound on the conditional smooth min-entropy of product states. The
following theorem is a straightforward generalization of Theorem 7 in [TCR08] (see also [Ren05,
Theorem 3.3.6]) to the case where the states are independently, but not necessarily identically
distributed. The theorem states that for a large number of independent states, the conditional
smooth min-entropy can be lower-bounded by the conditional Shannon entropy. We note that
it is a common feature of equipartition theorems for classical or quantum information that the
assumption of i.i.d. sources can be replaced by the weaker assumption of non-i.i.d. but independent
sources (see Appendix A.4 for the proof).
Theorem 3.4 (adapted from [TCR08]) For i = 1, . . . , n, let ρi ∈ S(HAB) be density operators.
Then, for any ε > 0,
Hε∞ (A
n|Bn)Nn
i=1 ρi
≥
n∑
i=1
[H(Ai|Bi)ρi ]− δ(ε, γ)
√
n ,
where, for n ≥ 85 log 2ε2 , the error is given by
δ(ε, γ) := 4 log γ
√
log
2
ε2
and the single-system entropy contribution by
γ ≤ 2 max
i
√
rank(ρAi) + 1 .
For the case of independent cq-states in Hilbert spaces with the same dimensions, we obtain
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Corollary 3.5 For i = 1, . . . , n, let ρXiBi be cq-states over (copies of) the same space HX ⊗HB.
Then for every ε > 0 and n ≥ 85 log 2ε2 ,
Hε∞ (X
n|Bn)Nn
i=1 ρXiBi
≥
n∑
i=1
H(X|B)ρXiBi − δn , (4)
where δ :=
√
log(2/ε2)
n 4 log(2
√
dimHX + 1).
We use the properties of the smooth min-entropy to prove the following two lemmas. These
lemmas show that the (smooth) min-entropy of two independent strings can be split.
Lemma 3.6 Let ε ≥ 0, and let ρX0E0 , ρX1E1 be two independent cq-states with
Hε
2
∞(X0X1|E0E1) ≥ α .
Additionally, let S0, S1 be classical random variables distributed over {0, 1}`. Then, there exists a
random variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that Hε∞(XDDSD|E0E1) ≥ α/2.
Proof. From the additivity of smooth min-entropy (Lemma 3.2) it follows that we can split the
min-entropy as
Hε∞ (X0|E0) + Hε∞ (X1|E1) ≥ Hε
2
∞ (X0X1|E0E1) ≥ α ,
and therefore, there exists D ∈ {0, 1} such that
Hε∞
(
XDDSD|E0E1
) ≥ α/2 ,
where we used the monotonicity of smooth min-entropy (Lemma 3.3). 2
Lemma 3.7 Let ε ≥ 0. Let ρXE =
⊗m−1
i=0 ρXiEi be a cq-state consisting of m independent cq-
substates such that Hε
2
∞ (XiXj |E) ≥ α for all i 6= j. Then there exists a random variable V over
{1, . . . ,m} such that for any v ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with P [V 6=v] > 0
Hε∞ (Xv|EvV, V 6=v) ≥ α/2− log(m) .
Proof. Let V ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} be the index which achieves the minimum of Hε∞ (Xi|Ei), i.e.
Hε∞ (XV |EV ) = mini Hε∞ (Xi|Ei). By the additivity of smooth min-entropy (Lemma 3.2), we have
for all v 6= V ,
α ≤ Hε2∞ (XvXV |E) ≤ Hε∞ (Xv|Ev) + Hε∞ (XV |EV ) .
It follows that Hε∞ (Xv|Ev, V 6= v) ≥ α/2. The chain rule (Lemma 3.1) then leads to the claim. 2
3.3 Tools
We also require the following technical results. This lemma is well-known, see [AS00] or [MP95]
for a proof.
Lemma 3.8 (Chernoff’s inequality) Let X1, . . . , Xn be identically and independently distributed
random variables with Bernoulli distribution, i.e. Xi = 1 with probability p and Xi = 0 with prob-
ability 1 − p. Then S := ∑ni=1Xi has a binomial distribution with parameters (n, p) and it holds
that
Pr [ |S − pn| > εn ] ≤ 2e−2ε2n .
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Privacy Amplification The OT protocol makes use of two-universal hash functions. These hash
functions are used for privacy amplification similar as in quantum key distribution. A class F of
functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` is called two-universal, if for all x 6= y ∈ {0, 1}n and f ∈ F chosen
uniformly at random from F , we have Pr[f(x) = f(y)] ≤ 2−` [CW79]. The following theorem
expresses how the application of hash functions can increase the privacy of a random variable X
given a quantum adversary holding ρE , the function F and a classical random variable U :
Theorem 3.9 ([Ren05, DFR+07]) Let F be a class of two-universal hash functions from {0, 1}n
to {0, 1}`. Let F be a random variable that is uniformly and independently distributed over F , and
let ρXUE be a ccq-state. Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
d(F (X)|F,U,E) ≤ 2− 12 (Hε∞(X|UE)−`)−1 + ε .
4 1-2 Oblivious Transfer
4.1 Security Definition and Protocol
In this section we prove the security of a randomized version of 1-2 OT (Theorem 4.2) from which
we can easily obtain 1-2 OT. In such a randomized 1-2 OT protocol, Alice does not input two strings
herself, but instead receives two strings S0, S1 ∈ {0, 1}` chosen uniformly at random. Randomized
OT (ROT) can easily be converted into OT. After the ROT protocol is completed, Alice uses her
strings S0, S1 obtained from ROT as one-time pads to encrypt her original inputs Sˆ0 and Sˆ1, i.e. she
sends an additional classical message consisting of Sˆ0⊕S0 and Sˆ1⊕S1 to Bob. Bob can retrieve the
message of his choice by computing SC ⊕ (SˆC ⊕SC) = SˆC . He stays completely ignorant about the
other message SˆC since he is ignorant about SC . The security of a quantum protocol implementing
ROT is formally defined in [DFR+07] and justified in [FS09] (see also [WW08]).
Definition 4.1 An ε-secure 1-2 ROT` is a protocol between Alice and Bob, where Bob has input
C ∈ {0, 1}, and Alice has no input.
• (Correctness) If both parties are honest, then for any distribution of Bob’s input C, Alice gets
outputs S0, S1 ∈ {0, 1}` which are ε-close to uniform and independent of C and Bob learns
Y = SC except with probability ε.
• (Security against dishonest Alice) If Bob is honest and obtains output Y , then for any cheating
strategy of Alice resulting in her state ρA, there exist random variables S′0 and S′1 such that
Pr[Y = S′C ] ≥ 1− ε and C is independent of S′0,S′1 and ρA2.
• (Security against dishonest Bob) If Alice is honest, then for any cheating strategy of Bob
resulting in his state ρB, there exists a random variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that d(SD|SDDρB) ≤
ε.
For convenience, we choose {+,×} instead of {0, 1} as domain of Bob’s choice bit C. We
consider the same protocol for ROT as in [DFR+07].
2Existence of the random variables S′0, S
′
1 has to be understood as follows: given the cq-state ρYA of honest Bob
and dishonest Alice, there exists a cccq-state ρY S′0S′1A such that tracing out the registers of S
′
0, S
′
1 yields the original
state ρY A and the stated properties hold.
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Figure 2: Bob performs a partial measurement Pi, followed by noise N , and outputs a guess bit xg
depending on his classical measurement outcome, the remaining quantum state, and the additional
basis information.
Protocol 1 ([DFR+07]) 1-2 ROT`
1. Alice picks X ∈R {0, 1}n and Θ ∈R {+,×}n. Let Ib = {i | Θi = b} for b ∈ {+,×}. At time
t = 0, she sends |X1〉Θ1 , . . . , |Xn〉Θn to Bob.
2. Bob measures all qubits in the basis corresponding to his choice bit C ∈ {+,×}. He obtains
outcome X ′ ∈ {0, 1}n.
3. Alice picks two hash functions F+, F× ∈R F , where F is a class of two-universal hash
functions. At the reveal time t = Trev, she sends I+,I×, F+,F× to Bob. Alice outputs
S+ = F+(X|I+) and S× = F×(X|I×)
3.
4. Bob outputs SC = FC(X ′|IC ).
4.2 Security Analysis
We show in this section that Protocol 1 is secure according to Definition 4.1, in case the dishonest
receiver is restricted to individual-storage attacks.
Correctness First of all, note that it is clear that the protocol fulfills its task correctly. Bob can
determine the string X|IC (except with negligible probability 2
−n the set IC is non-empty) and
hence obtains SC . Alice’s outputs S+, S× are perfectly independent of each other and of C.
Security against Dishonest Alice Security holds in the same way as shown in [DFR+07]. As
the protocol is non-interactive, Alice never receives any information from Bob at all, and Alice’s
input strings can be extracted by letting her interact with an unbounded receiver.
Security against Dishonest Bob Proving that the protocol is secure against Bob requires more
work. Our goal is to show that there exists a D ∈ {+,×} such that Bob is completely ignorant
about SD.
Recall that in round i, honest Alice picks Xi ∈R {0, 1} and Θi ∈R {+,×} and sends |Xi〉Θi to
dishonest Bob. Bob can subsequently do a partial measurement to obtain the classical outcome Ki
and store the remaining quantum state in register Ei which is then subject to noise (see Figure 2). It
3If X|Ib is less than n bits long Alice pads the string X|Ib with 0’s to get an n bit-string in order to apply the
hash function to n bits.
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is important to note that Bob’s initial partial measurement does not depend on the basis information
Θ. Since we are modeling individual-storage attacks, the overall state (as viewed by Bob) for Alice
and Bob right before time Trev is of the form
ρXΘKE =
n⊗
i=1
ρXiΘiKiEi ,
with
ρXiΘiKiEi =
1
4
∑
xi,θi,ki
pki|xiθi |xi〉〈xi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xi
⊗ |θi〉〈θi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θi
⊗ |ki〉〈ki|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ki
⊗Ni
(
ρkixiθi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ei
, (5)
where we use Xi to denote Alice’s system corresponding to her choice of bit xi, Θi for the system
corresponding to her choice of basis θi, and Ki and Ei for Bob’s systems corresponding to the clas-
sical outcome ki (with probability pki|xiθi) of his partial measurement and his remaining quantum
system respectively.
It is clear that a dishonest receiver will have some uncertainty about the bit Xi, given that
he either measured the register E without the correct basis information and that storage noise
occurred on the post-measurement quantum state. To formalize this uncertainty, let us call t an
uncertainty lower bound on the conditional Shannon entropy if, for all i = 1, . . . , n, we have
H(Xi|ΘiKiEi) = H(ρXiΘiKiEi)−H(ρΘiKiEi) ≥ t . (6)
The parameter t thereby depends on the specific kind of noise in the quantum storage. In Section 5,
we evaluate the uncertainty lower-bound t for the case of depolarizing noise.
The following theorem shows that as long as ` . tn/4, the protocol is secure except with
probability ε. Since we are performing 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer of `-bit strings, ` corresponds
to the “amount” of oblivious transfer we can perform for a given security parameter ε and number
of qubits n. In QKD, ` corresponds to the length of the key generated.
Theorem 4.2 Protocol 1 is 2ε-secure against a dishonest receiver Bob according to Definition 4.1,
if n ≥ 85 log 2ε4 and
` ≤ 1
4
(t− δ)n+ 1
2
− log
(
1
ε
)
,
where δ = 8
√
log(2/ε4)/n, and t is the uncertainty lower bound on the conditional Shannon entropy
fulfilling Eq. (6).
Proof. We need to show the existence of a binary random variable D such that SD¯ is ε-close
to uniform from Bob’s point of view. As noted above, the overall state of Alice and Bob before
time Trev has a product form. After time Trev, dishonest Bob holds the classical registers Θ,K,
the quantum register E as well as classical information about the hash functions F+, F×. To prove
security, we first lower-bound Bob’s uncertainty about X in terms of min-entropy, use Lemma 3.6
to obtain D and then apply the privacy amplification theorem.
First of all, we know from Corollary 3.5 that the smooth min-entropy of an n-fold tensor state is
roughly equal to n times the von Neumann entropy of its substates. Hence, applying Corollary 3.5
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to our setting with Bi : = ΘiKiEi and log(2
√
dimHXi + 1) = log(2
√
2 + 1) ≤ 2 we obtain for
n ≥ 85 log 2ε4 that
Hε
2
∞ (X|ΘKE) ≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|ΘiKiEi)− δn ≥ (t− δ)n ,
with δ = 8
√
log(2/ε4)/n. We used Equation (4) in the first inequality and the last follows by
Definition (6) of the uncertainty bound t.
For ease of notation, we use X+ and X× to denote X|I+ and X|I× , the sequences of bits Xi
where Θi = + and Θi = ×, respectively. From Hε2∞ (X+X×|ΘKE) ≥ (t − δ)n and Lemma 3.6 it
follows that D ∈ {+,×} exists such that
Hε∞
(
XDDSD|ΘKE
) ≥ (t− δ)n
2
.
The rest of the security proof is analogous to the derivation in [DFR+07]: It follows from the chain
rule (Lemma 3.1) and the monotonicity (Lemma 3.3) of the smooth min-entropy that
Hε∞
(
XD|ΘDSDKE
) ≥ Hε∞ (XDDSD|ΘKE)− (`+ 1)
≥ (t− δ)n
2
− 1− `.
The privacy amplification Theorem 3.9 yields
d(FD(XD) | ΘFDDSDKE) ≤ 2−
1
2
((t−δ)n
2
+1−2`) + ε (7)
which is smaller than 2ε as long as
(t− δ)n
4
+
1
2
− ` ≥ log
(
1
ε
)
.
from which our claim follows. 2
We note that one can improve on the extractable length ` by using a quantum version of Wullschleger’s
distributed-privacy-amplification theorem [Wul07]. Since this technique is specific to oblivious
transfer and does not apply to our extension to the case of secure identification, we do not go into
the details here.
5 Example: Depolarizing Noise
In this section, we consider the case when Bob’s storage is affected by depolarizing noise as described
by the quantum operation
N (ρ) = rρ+ (1− r) id
2
. (8)
Depolarization noise will leave the input state ρ intact with probability r, but replace it with the
completely mixed state with probability 1 − r. In order to give explicit security parameters for
this setting, our goal is to prove an uncertainty bound t for the conditional von Neumann entropy
H(Xi|ΘiKiEi) as in Eq. (6). Exploiting the symmetries in the setting, we derive in Appendix B
the following result. We drop the index i in this Theorem.
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Theorem 5.1 Let N be the depolarizing quantum operation given by Eq. (8) and let H(X|ΘKE)
be the conditional von Neumann entropy of one qubit. Then
H(X|ΘKE) ≥
{
h(1+r2 ) for r ≥ rˆ ,
1/2 for r < rˆ ,
where rˆ := 2h−1(1/2)− 1 ≈ 0.7798.
Our result shows that when the probability of retaining the input state ρ is small, r < 0.7798,
the best attack for Bob is to measure everything right away in the computational basis. For this
measurement, we have H(X|ΘKE) ≥ 1/2. If the depolarizing rate is low, i.e. r ≥ 0.7798, our result
says that the best strategy for Bob is to simply store the qubit as is.
Our result may seem contradictory to our previous error trade-off obtained in [WST07], where
Bob’s best strategy was to either store the qubit as is or measure it in the Breidbart basis depending
on the amount of depolarizing noise. Note, however, that the quantity we optimize in this work is the
von Neumann entropy and not the guessing probability considered in [WST07]. This phenomenon
is similar to the setting of QKD, where Eve’s strategy that optimizes her guessing probability is
different from the one that optimizes the entropy [GRTZ02]. In general, the von Neumann entropy
is larger than the min-entropy (which corresponds to the guessing probability). Corollary 3.5
provides the explanation why the von Neumann entropy is the relevant quantity in the setting of
individual-storage attacks.
6 Robust Oblivious Transfer
In a practical setting, honest Alice and honest Bob are not able to perform perfect quantum
operations or transmit qubits through a noiseless channel. We must therefore modify the ROT
protocol to make it robust against noise for the honest parties. The protocol we consider is a small
modification of the protocol considered in [Sch07]. The idea is to let Alice send additional error-
correcting information which can help honest Bob to retrieve SC as desired. The main difficulty
in the analysis of the extended protocol is the fact that we have to assume a worst-case scenario:
If Bob is dishonest, we give him access to a perfect noise-free quantum channel with Alice and he
only experiences noise during storage.
We can divide the noise on the channel into two categories, which we consider separately:
First, we consider erasure noise (in practice corresponding to photon loss) during preparation,
transmission and measurement of the qubits by the honest parties. Let 1 − perase be the total
probability for an honest Bob to measure and detect a photon in the {+,×}-basis given that
an honest Alice prepares a weak pulse in her lab and sends it to him. The probability perase is
determined, among other things, by the mean photon number in the pulse, the loss on the channel
and the quantum efficiency of the detector. In our protocol we assume that the erasure rate perase
is independent for every pulse and independent of whether qubits were encoded or measured in the
+- or ×-basis whenever Bob is honest. This assumption is necessary to guarantee the correctness
and the security against a cheating Alice only. Fortunately, this assumption is well matched with
the possible physical implementations of the protocol.
Any other noise source during preparation, transmission and measurement can be characterized
as an effective classical noisy channel resulting in the output bits X ′ that Bob obtains at Step 3 of
Protocol 2. For simplicity, we model this compound noise source as a classical binary symmetric
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channel acting independently on each bit of X. Typical noise sources for polarization-encoded
qubits are depolarization during transmission, dark counts in Bob’s detector and misaligned po-
larizing beam-splitters. Let the effective bit-error probability, called the quantum bit-error rate in
quantum key distribution, of this binary symmetric channel be perror < 1/2.
6.1 Protocol
In this section we present the modified version of the ROT protocol. Before engaging in the actual
protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a small enough security-error probability ε > 0 that they are
willing to tolerate. In addition, they determine the system parameters perase and perror similarly
to Step 1 of the protocol in [BBCS92]. Furthermore, they agree on a family {Cn} of linear error-
correcting codes of length n capable of efficiently correcting n · perror errors [Cre´97]. For any string
x ∈ {0, 1}n, error-correction is done by sending the syndrome information syn(x) to Bob from
which he can correctly recover x if he holds an output x′ ∈ {0, 1}n obtained by flipping each bit of
x independently with probability perror. It is known that for large enough n, the code Cn can be
chosen such that its rate is arbitrarily close to 1− h(perror) and the syndrome length (the number
of parity check bits) is asymptotically bounded by |syn(x)| < h(perror)n [Cre´97]. We assume that
the players have synchronized clocks. In each time slot, Alice sends one qubit to Bob.
Protocol 2 Robust 1-2 ROT`(C, T, ε)
1. Alice picks X ∈R {0, 1}n and Θ ∈R {+,×}n.
2. For i = 1, . . . , n: In time slot t = i, Alice sends |Xi〉Θi as a phase- or polarization-encoded
weak pulse of light to Bob.
3. In each time slot, Bob measures the incoming qubit in the basis corresponding to his choice
bit C ∈ {+,×} and records whether he detects a photon or not. He obtains some bit-string
X ′ ∈ {0, 1}m with m ≤ n.
4. Bob reports back to Alice in which time slots he received a qubit. Alice restricts herself to the
set of m < n bits that Bob did not report as missing. Let this set of qubits be Sremain with
|Sremain| = m.
5. Let Ib = {i ∈ Sremain | Θi = b} for b ∈ {+,×} and let mb = |Ib|. Alice aborts the protocol if
either m+ or m× are outside the interval [(1−perase−ε)n/2, (1−perase +ε)n/2]. If this is not
the case, Alice picks two two-universal hash functions F+, F× ∈R F . At time t = n + Trev,
Alice sends I+,I×, F+,F×, and the syndromes syn(X|I+) and syn(X|I×) according to codes
of appropriate length mb to Bob. Alice outputs S+ = F+(X|I+) and S× = F×(X|I×).
6. Bob uses syn(X|IC ) to correct the errors on his output X
′
|IC . He obtains the corrected bit-
string Xcor and outputs S′C = FC(Xcor).
6.2 Security Analysis
Correctness By assumption, perase is independent for every pulse and independent of the basis
in which Alice sent the qubits. Thus, by Chernoff’s Inequality (Lemma 3.8), Sremain is, except with
negligible probability, a random subset of m qubits independent of the value of Θ and such that
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(1 − perase − ε)n ≤ m ≤ (1 − perase + ε)n . This implies that in Step 5 the protocol is aborted
with a probability only exponentially small in n. The codes are chosen such that Bob can decode
except with negligible probability. These facts imply that if both parties are honest, the protocol
is correct (i.e. SC = S′C) with exponentially small probability of error.
Security against Dishonest Alice Even though in this scenario Bob does communicate to
Alice, the information about which qubits were erased is (by assumption) independent of the basis
in which he measured and thus of his choice bit C. Hence Alice does not learn anything about his
choice bit C. Her input strings can be extracted as in the analysis of Protocol 1.
Security against Dishonest Bob We prove the following:
Theorem 6.1 Protocol 2 is secure against a dishonest receiver Bob with error of at most 2ε, if
n ≥ 85 log 2ε4 and
` ≤ (t− δ − h(perror)) (1− perase)n4 − ε
n
2
+
1
2
− log
(
1
ε
)
, (9)
where δ = 8
√
log(2/ε4)/((1− perase − ε)n), and t is the uncertainty bound on the conditional Shan-
non entropy fulfilling Eq. (6).
Proof (Sketch). First of all, we note that Bob can always make Alice abort the protocol by
reporting back an insufficient number of received qubits. If Alice does not abort the protocol in
Step 5, we have that (1 − perase − ε)n/2 ≤ m+,m× ≤ (1 − perase + ε)n/2. We define D as in the
security proof of Protocol 1. The security analysis is the same, but we need to subtract the amount
of error correcting information |syn(X|ID)| from the entropy of the dishonest receiver. If Alice does
not abort the protocol in Step 5, we have that |syn(X|ID)| ≤ h(perror)(1− perase + ε)n/2. Hence,
Hε∞
(
XD|ΘFDDSDsyn(X|ID)KE
)
≥ Hε∞
(
XDDSDsyn(X|ID)|ΘFDKE
)
− (`+ 1)− h(perror)m/2
≥ (t− δ)(1− perase − ε)n/2− (`+ 1)− h(perror)(1− perase + ε)n/2− 1− `
≥ (t− δ − h(perror)(1− perase)n/2− (t− δ + h(perror))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤2
εn/2− 1− ` ,
where (t− δ+ h(perror)) ≤ 2 since t ≤ 1. Using this inequality to bound the security parameter via
the privacy amplification Theorem 3.9 gives the claimed bound on `, Eq. (9). 2
Remarks Note that it is only possible to choose a code C that satisfies the stated parameters
asymptotically. For a real—finite block-length—code, deviations from this asymptotic behavior
need to be taken into account. For the sake of clarity we have omitted these details in the analysis
above. Secondly, the dishonest parties need to obtain an estimate for perror prior to the protocol.
One approach would be to use a worst case estimate based what is possible with present-day
technology. Alternatively, one could follow Step 1 of the protocol in [BBCS92] as suggested above.
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However, one needs to analyze this estimation procedure in a practical setting. Thirdly, when
weak photon sources are used in this protocol, one needs to analyze the security threat due to the
presence of multi-photon emissions which Bob can exploit in photon-number-splitting attacks as in
QKD. See [WST07] for a first discussion of the effect of such attacks.
6.3 Depolarizing Noise
As an example, we again consider the security trade-off when Bob’s storage is affected by depolar-
izing noise. It follows directly from Theorems 3.9, 6.1 and 5.1 that
Corollary 6.2 Let N be the depolarizing quantum operation given by Eq. (8). Then the protocol
can be made secure (by choosing a sufficiently large n) as long as
h
(
1 + r
2
)
> h(perror) for r ≥ rˆ,
1/2 > h(perror) for r < rˆ,
where rˆ := 2h−1(1/2)− 1 ≈ 0.7798.
Hence, our security parameters are greatly improved from our previous analysis [WST07]. For
r < rˆ we can now obtain security as long as the quantum bit error rate perror / 0.11, compared
to 0.029 before. For the case of r ≥ rˆ, we can essentially show security as long as the noise on
the channel is strictly less than the noise in Bob’s quantum storage. Note that we cannot hope to
construct a protocol that is both correct and secure when the noise of the channel exceeds the noise
in Bob’s quantum storage. However, it remains an open question whether it is possible to construct
a protocol or improve the analysis of the current protocol such that security can be achieved even
for very small n.
Corollary 6.2 puts a restriction on the noise rate of the honest protocol. Yet, since our protocols
are particularly interesting at short distances (e.g. in the case of secure identification we describe
below), we can imagine free-space implementations over very short distances such that depolar-
ization noise during transmission is negligible and the main noise source is due to Bob’s honest
measurements.
In the near-future, if good photonic memories become available (see e.g. [JSC+04, BBM+07,
CMJ+05, EAM+05, RBV+07, PF02] for recent progress), we may anticipate that storing the qubit
is a better attack than a direct measurement. Note, however, that we are free in our protocol to
stretch the reveal time Trev between Bob’s reception of the qubits and his reception of the classical
basis information, say, to seconds, which means that one has to consider the overall noise rate on
a qubit that is stored for seconds.
In terms of long-term security, fault-tolerant photonic computation (e.g., with the KLM scheme
[KLM01]) might allow a dishonest Bob to encode the incoming quantum information into a fault-
tolerant quantum memory. Such an encoding would guarantee that the effective noise rate in
storage can be made arbitrarily small. The encoding of a single unknown state is not a fault-
tolerant quantum operation however. Hence, even in the presence of a quantum computer, there is
a residual storage noise rate due to the unprotected encoding operation. The question of security
then becomes a question of a trade-off between this residual noise rate versus the intrinsic noise
rate for honest parties. Intuitively, it might be possible to arrange the setting such that tasks of
honest players are always technically easier (and/or cheaper) to perform than the ones for dishonest
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players. Possibly, this intrinsic gap can be exploited for cryptographic purposes. The current paper
can be appreciated as a first step in this direction.
7 Extension to Secure Identification
In this section, we like to point out how our model of noisy quantum storage with individual-storage
attacks also applies to protocols that achieve more advanced tasks such as secure identification.
The protocol from [DFSS07] allows a user U to identify him/herself to a server S by means of a
personal identification number (PIN). This task can be achieved by securely evaluating the equality
function on the player’s inputs. In other words, both U and S input passwords WU and WS into
the protocol and the server learns as output whether WU = WS or not. The protocol proposed
in [DFSS07] is secure against an unbounded user U and a quantum-memory bounded server S in
the sense that it is guaranteed that if a dishonest player starts with quantum side information
which is uncorrelated with the honest player’s password W , the only thing the dishonest player
can do is guess a possible W ′ and learn whether W = W ′ or not while not learning anything more
than this mere bit of information about the honest user’s password W . This protocol can also be
(non-trivially) extended to additionally withstand man-in-the-middle attacks.
The security proof against a quantum-memory bounded dishonest server (and man-in-the-
middle attacks) relies heavily on the uncertainty relation first derived in [DFR+07] and used for
proving the security of 1-2 OT. This uncertainty relation guarantees a lower bound on the smooth
min-entropy of the encoded string X from the dishonest player’s point of view. As we establish a
similar type of lower bound (Cor. 3.5 and Eq. (6)) on the smooth min-entropy in the noisy-storage
model, the security proof for the identification scheme (and its extension) translates to our model.
In terms of the proof of Proposition 3.1 of [DFSS07], the pair Xi, Xj has essentially t · d bits of
min-entropy given Θ,K, and E, where t is the uncertainty lower bound on the conditional Shannon
entropy from Eq. (6) and d is the minimal distance of the code used in the identification scheme.
Lemma 3.7 implies that there exists W ′ (called V in Lemma 3.7) such that if W 6= W ′ then XW
has essentially td/2− log(m) bits of min-entropy given W,W ′,Θ,K,E. Privacy amplification then
guarantees that F (XW ) is ε′-close to uniform and independent of F,W,W ′,Θ,K,E, conditioned on
W 6= W ′, where ε′ = 122−
1
2
(td/2−log(m)−`). Security against a dishonest server with noisy quantum
storage follows as in [DFSS07] for an error parameter ε which is exponentially small in td−2 log(m)−
2`.
8 Conclusion
We have obtained improved security parameters for oblivious transfer in the noisy-quantum-storage
model. Yet, it remains to prove security against general coherent noisy attacks. The problem
with analyzing a coherent attack of Bob described by some quantum operation S affecting all his
incoming qubits is not merely a technical one: one first needs to determine a realistic noise model in
this setting. Symmetrizing the protocol as in the proof of QKD [Ren05] and using de Finetti type
arguments does not immediately work here. However, one can analyze a specific type of coherent
noise, one that essentially corresponds to an eavesdropping attack in QKD. Note that the 1-2 OT
protocol can be seen as two runs of QKD interleaved with each other. The strings f(x|I+) and
f(x|I×) are then the two keys generated. The noise must be such that it leaves Bob with exactly
the same information as the eavesdropper Eve in QKD. In this case, it follows from the security
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of QKD that the dishonest Bob (learning exactly the same information as the eavesdropper Eve)
does not learn anything about the two keys.
Clearly, there is a strong relation between QKD and the protocol for 1-2 OT, and one may
wonder whether other QKD protocols can be used to perform oblivious transfer in our model.
Intuitively, this is indeed the case, but it remains to evaluate explicit parameters for the security
of the resulting protocols.
It will be interesting to extend our results to a security analysis of a noise-robust protocol in a
realistic physical setting, where, for example, the use of weak laser pulses allows the possibility of
photon-number-splitting attacks. Such a comprehensive security analysis has been carried out in
[GLLP04] for quantum key distribution.
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A Appendix: Properties of The Conditional Smooth Min-Entropy
In this Appendix we provide the technical proofs of the Lemmas and the Theorem in Section 3.2.1.
We restate the claims for convenience.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1 (Chain Rule)
Lemma A.1 (Chain Rule) For any ccq-state ρXY E ∈ S(HXY E) and for all ε ≥ 0, it holds that
Hε∞ (X|Y E) ≥ Hε∞ (XY |E)− log |Y|,
where |Y| is the alphabet size of the random variable Y .
Proof. For ε = 0, it follows from Eq. (3) that we need to show that
Pguess(XY |E) ≥ Pguess(X|Y E) · 1|Y| . (10)
For a given value y, let {Myx}x be the POVM on register E which optimally guesses X given Y . A
particular strategy of guessing X and Y from E is to guess a value of y uniformly at random from
Y and subsequently measure E with the POVM {Myx}x. The success probability of this strategy is
exactly the r.h.s of (10). Clearly, the optimal guessing probability Pguess(XY |E) can only be better
than this particular strategy. For ε > 0, let ρˆXY E ∈ Kε(ρXY E) be the state in the ε-ball around
ρXY E that maximizes the min-entropy Hε∞ (XY |E). The technique from Remark 3.2.4 in [Ren05]
can be used to show that ρˆXY E is a ccq-state. By the derivation above for ε = 0, we obtain that
Pguess(XY |E)ρˆ ≥ Pguess(X|Y E)ρˆ · 1|Y|
≥ min
ρ˜XYE∈Kε(ρXYE)
Pguess(X|Y E)ρ˜ · 1|Y| ,
which proves the lemma by taking the negative logarithms and using Eq. (3). 2
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2 (Additivity)
To show additivity of the smooth min-entropy we will employ semidefinite programming, where
we refer to [BV04] for in-depth information. Here, we will use semidefinite programming in the
language of [KRS09] to express the primal and dual optimization problem given by parameters
c ∈ V1 and b ∈ V2 in vector spaces V1 and V2 with inner products 〈·, ·〉1 and 〈·, ·〉2. We will
optimize over variables v1 ∈ K1 and v2 ∈ K2, where K1 ⊂ V1 and K2 ⊂ V2 are convex cones in
the respective vector spaces. In our application below, these will simply be the cones of positive-
semidefinite matrices. We can then write
γprimal = min
v1≥0
Av1≥b
〈v1, c〉1 and γdual = max
v2≥0
A∗v2≤c
〈b, v2〉2, (11)
where A : V1 → V2 is a linear map defining the particular problem we wish to solve. We use
A∗ : V2 → V1 to denote its dual map satisfying
〈Av1, v2〉2 = 〈v1, A∗v2〉1 for all v1 ∈ V1, v2 ∈ V2 .
Note that we have γprimal ≥ γdual by weak duality. In this case our SDPs will be strongly feasible,
giving us γprimal = γdual known as strong duality. Our proof is based on the same idea as [WST07,
Lemma 2] applied to the smoothed setting. We thank Robert Ko¨nig for allowing us to include the
following.
Lemma A.2 (Additivity (Ko¨nig and Wehner)) Let ρAB and ρA′B′ be two independent qq-
states. For ε ≥ 0, it holds that
Hε
2
∞
(
AA′|BB′) ≤ Hε∞ (A|B) + Hε∞ (A′|B′) .
Proof. In order to prove additivity, it is important to realize that the smooth conditional
min-entropy can be written as semi-definite program:
Hε∞ (A|B) = max
ρˆAB∈Kε(ρAB)
H∞(A|B)ρˆ
= max
ρˆAB∈Kε(ρAB)
− log min
σB≥0
ˆρABC≥0
idA⊗σB≥ρˆAB
Tr(σB) (12)
= − log min
σB≥0
ˆρABC≥0
ρˆAB∈Kε(ρAB)
idA⊗σB≥ρˆAB
Tr(σB) . (13)
where σB ∈ P(HB) throughout. Let |ψ〉ABC be a purification of ρAB. Then, all states ρˆAB ∈
Kε(ρAB) can be obtained by an extension ρˆABC ≥ 0 such that Tr(ρˆABC) ≤ 1, and Tr(ρˆABC |ψABC〉〈ψABC |) ≥
1− δ with δ = ε2. Therefore, we can write
Hε∞ (A|B) = − log minTr(ρˆABC |ψABC〉〈ψABC |)≥1−δ
1≥Tr(ρˆABC)
idA⊗σB≥ρˆAB
Tr(σB) ,
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where the minimum is taken over all σB ∈ P(HB) and ρˆABC ∈ P(HABC), which is a semi-definite
program (SDP). Our goal will be to determine the dual of this semidefinite program which will
then allow us to put an upper bound on the smooth min-entropy as desired.
We now first show how to convert the primal of this semidefinite program into the form of
Eq. (11). Let V1 = Herm(HB)⊕Herm(HABC) where Herm(H) is the (real) vector space of Hermi-
tian operators onH. LetK1 ⊂ V1 be the cone of positive semi-definite operators. Let c = idB⊕0ABC
where 0ABC is the zero-operator on HABC . Let the inner product be defined as 〈v1, v′1〉1 = Tr(v†1v′1).
Note that this allows us to express our objective function as
〈σB ⊕ ρˆABC , c〉1 = Tr(σB).
It remains to rewrite the constraints in the appropriate form. To this end, we need to define
V2 = R ⊕ R ⊕ Herm(HA) ⊕ Herm(HB), K2 ⊂ V2 the cone of positive semi-definite operators and
take the inner product to have the same form 〈v2, v′2〉2 = Tr(v†2v′2). We then let b ∈ V2 be given as
b = (1− δ)⊕ (−1)⊕ 0AB ,
and define the map
A(σB ⊕ ρˆABC) = Tr(ρˆABC |ψABC〉〈ψABC |)⊕ (−Tr(ρˆABC))⊕ (idA ⊗ σB − ρˆAB) .
Note that v1 = σB ⊕ ρˆABC ≥ 0 and A(v1) ≥ b now exactly represent our constraints.
We now use this formalism to find the dual. Note that we may write any v2 ∈ V2 with v2 ≥ 0
as v2 = r ⊕ s⊕QAB where QAB ∈ P(HA ⊗HB) and r, s ∈ R. To find the dual map A∗ note that
〈Av1, v2〉2 = rTr(ρˆABC |ψABC〉〈ψABC |)− sTr(ρˆABC) + Tr(QAB(idA ⊗ σB − ρˆAB))
= rTr(ρˆABC |ψABC〉〈ψABC |)− sTr(ρˆABC) + Tr(QBσB)− Tr((QAB ⊗ idC)ρˆABC),
and we therefore have
A∗(v2) = (0B ⊕ r|ψABC〉〈ψABC |)− (sidABC) + (QB ⊕ 0ABC)− (0B ⊕QAB ⊗ idC) ,
which is all we require using Eq. (11). To find a more intuitive interpretation of the dual note that
A∗(v2) ≤ c is equivalent to
idB ≥ QB , (14)
QAB ⊗ idC ≥ r|ψABC〉〈ψABC | − sidABC , (15)
and 〈b, v2〉2 = r(1− δ)− s. The dual can thus be written as
γdual = max
r≥0,s≥0
idB≥QB
QAB⊗idC≥r|ψABC〉〈ψABC |−sidABC
r(1− δ)− s .
We now use the dual formulation to upper bound the smooth min-entropy of the combined
state ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′ and parameter δ˜ by finding a lower bound to the dual semidefinite program.
Let γ˜(δ˜) denote the optimal solution of the dual of the SDP for the combined state for error δ˜.
For each individual state, we may solve the above SDP, where we let QAB, r and s denote the
optimal solution for state ρAB with parameter δ and optimal value γ(δ), and let QA′B′ , r′ and s′
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denote the optimal solution for state ρA′B′ with parameter δ′ and optimal value γ(δ′). We now
use these solutions to construct a solution (not necessarily the optimal one) for the combined state
ρAB⊗ρA′B′ . Let Q˜ = QAB⊗QA′B′ , r˜ = rr′ and s˜ = rs′(1− δ) + sr′(1− δ′)− ss′. Note that rs′ ≥ 0
and r′(1− δ′)− s′ ≥ 0 for the optimal r′, s′ and hence
r˜ ≥ 0 , s˜ ≥ 0 ,
idBB′ ≥ Q˜BB′ ,
Q˜AA′BB′ ⊗ idCC′ ≥ (r |ψABC〉〈ψABC | − s idABC)⊗ (r′ |ψA′B′C′〉〈ψA′B′C′ | − s idA′B′C′)
≥ r˜ |ψABC〉〈ψABC | ⊗ |ψA′B′C′〉〈ψA′B′C′ | − s˜ idABC ⊗ idA′B′C′ ,
and thus Q˜ is indeed a feasible solution for the combined problem. Choosing δ˜ as
δ˜ = δ + δ′ − δδ′
we have
γ˜(δ˜) ≥ r˜(1− δ˜)− s˜ = γ(δ)γ′(δ′) .
We hence obtain
H
√
δ˜
∞ (A˜|B˜) ≤ H
√
δ
∞ (A|B) + H
√
δ′
∞ (A
′|B′) .
For δ = δ′, we have
δ˜ = 2δ − δ2 ≥ δ2 .
Putting everything together we thus have
Hδ∞(A˜|B˜) ≤ H
√
δ
∞ (A|B) + H
√
δ
∞ (A
′|B′) ,
from which the result follows since δ = ε2. 2
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3 (Monotonicity)
Lemma A.3 (Monotonicity) For a ccq-state ρXY E and for all ε ≥ 0, it holds that
Hε∞ (XY |E) ≥ Hε∞ (Y |E) .
Proof. For ε = 0, the lemma follows from Eq. (3), that is, guessing XY from E is harder than
guessing only Y from E and therefore, Pguess(XY |E) ≤ Pguess(Y |E).
For ε > 0 the idea behind the argument is similar. Let the maximum in Hε∞ (Y |E) be achieved
by a density matrix ρˆY E , i.e. Hε∞ (Y |E) = H∞(Y |E)ρˆ such that C(ρY E , ρˆY E) ≤ ε and Tr(ρˆY E) ≤ 1.
Remark 3.2.4 in [Ren05] shows that ρˆY E is a cq-state. We can express this min-entropy in terms
of the guessing probability, Eq. (3), and thus
Hε∞ (Y |E)ρˆ = − log Pguess(Y |E)ρˆY E ≤ − log Pguess(XY |E)ρˆXYE , (16)
24
where ρˆXY E is any ccq-state which has ρˆY E as its reduced state, i.e TrX(ρˆXY E) = ρˆY E . Now
we would like to show that one can choose an extension ρˆXY E such that C(ρXY E , ρˆXY E) =√
1− F (ρXY E , ρˆXY E)2 ≤ ε and Tr(ρˆXY E) ≤ 1. If we can determine such an extension, we can
upper-bound the r.h.s. in Eq. (16) by Hε∞ (XY |E) which is the supremum of − log Pguess(XY |E)
over states in the ε-neighborhood of ρXY E . This would prove the Lemma.
Let |Ψ〉XY EC be a purification of ρXY E and hence also a purification of ρY E . By Uhlmann’s
theorem (see e.g. [NC00]), we have for the fidelity F (ρY E , ρˆY E) between ρY E and ρˆY E that
F (ρY E , ρˆY E) = max|Ψ′〉XYEC
|〈Ψ|Ψ′〉| := F (|Ψ〉〈Ψ|, |Ψˆ〉〈Ψˆ|) ,
where |Ψˆ〉XY EC is the purification of ρˆY E achieving the maximum. The monotonicity property of
the fidelity under taking the partial trace gives
F (|Ψ〉〈Ψ|, |Ψˆ〉〈Ψˆ|) ≤ F (TrC(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|),TrC(|Ψˆ〉〈Ψˆ|)) = F (ρXY E , ρˆXY E) ,
where ρˆXY E := TrC(|ΨˆXY EC〉〈ΨˆXY EC |). Hence√
1− ε2 ≤ F (ρY E , ρˆY E) ≤ F (ρXY E , ρˆXY E) , (17)
and therefore, C(ρXY E , ρˆXY E) ≤ ε. If Tr(ρˆXY E) > 1, it follows that also Tr(ρˆY E) > 1 which
contradicts the assumption. Therefore, it must be the case that Tr(ρˆXY E) ≤ 1.
It remains to show that ρˆXY E is a ccq-state. Because of
F (ρY E , ρˆY E) = F (|Ψ〉〈Ψ|, |Ψˆ〉〈Ψˆ|)
≤ F (TrC(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|),TrC(|Ψˆ〉〈Ψˆ|)) = F (ρXY E , ρˆXY E) ≤ F (ρY E , ρˆY E) ,
these quantities are all equal and in particular, we could do a measurement on the X-register of
ρˆXY E without increasing the fidelity. Hence, we can assume the optimal purification |ΨˆXY EC〉〈ΨˆXY EC |
is such that ρˆXY E is a ccq-state. 2
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Theorem A.4 For i = 1, . . . , n, let ρi ∈ S(HAB) be density operators. Then, for any ε > 0,
Hε∞ (A
n|Bn)Nn
i=1 ρi
≥
n∑
i=1
[H(Ai|Bi)ρi ]− δ(ε, γ)
√
n ,
where, for n ≥ 85 log 2ε2 , the error is given by
δ(ε, γ) := 4 log γ
√
log
2
ε2
and the single-system entropy contribution by
γ ≤ 2 max
i
√
rank(ρAi) + 1 .
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Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 7 in [TCR08]. For convenience, we point
out where their proof needs to be adapted. We need the following definitions. Let H′AB be a copy
of HAB and let |γ〉 :=
∑
i |i〉⊗ |i〉 be the unnormalized fully entangled state on HAB⊗H′AB. Define
the purification |φ〉 := (√ρAB ⊗ idAB)|γ〉 of ρAB and let 1 < α ≤ 2, β := α − 1, and X := ρAB ⊗
(idA⊗ρ−1B )T . The conditional α-entropy is defined as Hα(A|B)ρ|σ := 11−α log Tr(ραAB(idA⊗σB)1−α).
The authors of [TCR08] prove the following lower bound
Hα(A|B)ρ|ρ ≥ H(A|B)ρ −
1
β ln 2
〈φ|rβ(X)|φ〉 , (18)
where rβ(t) := tβ − β ln t− 1.
Let ρˆ = ρ1AB ⊗ . . .⊗ ρnAB. Then, as in Equation (27) of [TCR08], we have
Hε∞ (A
n|Bn)ρˆ ≥ Hε∞ (An|Bn)ρˆ|ρˆ ≥ Hα(An|Bn)ρˆ|ρˆ −
1
β
log
2
ε2
=
n∑
i=1
Hα(A|B)ρi|ρi −
1
β
log
2
ε2
≥
n∑
i=1
(
H(A|B)ρi −
1
β ln 2
〈φ|rβ(Xi)|φ〉
)
− 1
β
log
2
ε2
, (19)
where we used (18) in the last step.
Let us define the single-system entropy contributions γi := 〈φ|
√
Xi + 1/
√
Xi + id|φ〉 of which
we know that they are all ≥ 3 and let γmax be the largest of them. By choosing an appropriate
µ ≥ 0 such that
β =
1
2µ
√
n
≤
√
5
8
1
2 log γmax
≤ min
{
1
4
,
1
2 log γmax
}
,
we can bound
1
β ln 2
〈φ|rβ(Xi)|φ〉 ≤ 2
µ
√
n
log2(γi) ≤ 2
µ
√
n
log2(γmax)
Therefore, we can further lower bound (19) as
Hε∞ (A
n|Bn)ρˆ ≥
n∑
i=1
H(A|B)ρi −
n∑
i=1
2
µ
√
n
log2(γmax)− 2µ
√
n log
2
ε2
≥
n∑
i=1
H(A|B)ρi − 2
√
n
(
1
µ
log2(γmax) + µ log
2
ε2
)
.
and the rest of the derivation goes as after Equation (28) in [TCR08].
In order to obtain the upper bound on γ, we notice that H1/2(A|B)ρ|ρ ≤ H1/2(A)ρ ≤ H0(A)ρ =
log(rank(ρA)). 2
B Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.1
B.1 Setting the Stage
We use the symmetries inherent in our problem to prove Theorem 5.1 in a series of steps.
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Theorem B.1 Let N be the depolarizing quantum operation given by Eq. (8) and let H(X|ΘKE)
be the conditional von Neumann entropy of one qubit. Then
H(X|ΘKE) ≥
{
h(1+r2 ) for r ≥ rˆ ,
1/2 for r < rˆ ,
where rˆ := 2h−1(1/2)− 1 ≈ 0.7798.
In order to prove the theorem, we find Bob’s strategy which minimizes H(X|ΘKE) as a function of
the depolarizing noise parameter r. As depicted in Figure 2, in each round the dishonest receiver
Bob receives one of the four possible BB84 states ρxθ at random. On such state he may then perform
any (partial) measurement M given by measurement operators M = {Fk} such that
∑
k F
†
kFk = id.
For clarity of notation, we do not use a subscript to indicate the round i as in the Figure. We
denote by E the register containing the renormalized post-measurement state
ρk,Mxθ =
Fkρx,θF
†
k
pk|xθ
,
to which the depolarizing quantum operation N is applied. Here
pMk|xθ = Tr(FkρxθF
†
k )
is the probability to measure outcome k when given state ρxθ. We omit the superscript M if it is
clear which measurement is used. Note that we may write
pMxθk =
1
4
pMk|xθ ,∑
x
pMxθk = p
M
θk =
1
4
Tr
(
Fk (ρ0θ + ρ1θ)F
†
k
)
=
1
4
Tr(FkF
†
k ) ,
and
pMx|θk =
pMk|xθ
4pMθk
.
Here we have used the fact that Alice chooses the basis and bit in each round uniformly and
independently at random.
First of all, note that for a cq-state ρY E =
∑
y PY (y)|y〉〈y| ⊗ ρEy , the von Neumann entropy can
be expanded as
H(Y E) = H(Y ) +
∑
y
PY (y) H(ρEy ) .
Using this expansion, we can write
H(X|ΘKE)M = H(XΘKE)M −H(ΘKE)M
= H(XΘK)M +
∑
xθk
pMxθk H
(
N
(
ρk,Mxθ
))
−H(ΘK)M −
∑
θk
pMθk H
(
N
(∑
x
pMx|θkρ
k,M
xθ
))
= H(X|ΘK)M +
∑
xθk
pMxθk H
(
N
(
ρk,Mxθ
))
−
∑
θk
pMθk H
(∑
x
pMx|θkN
(
ρk,Mxθ
))
. (20)
We use the notation H(X|ΘKE)M to emphasize that we consider the conditional von Neumann
entropy when Bob performed a partial measurement M . In the following, we use the shorthand
B(M) := H(X|ΘKE)M .
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B.2 Using Symmetries to Reduce Degrees of Freedom
Our goal is to minimize B(M) over all possible measurements M = {Fk} as a function of r. We
proceed in three steps. First, we simplify our problem considerably until we are left with a single
Hermitian measurement operator over which we need to minimize the entropy. Second, we show
that the optimal measurement operator is diagonal in the computational basis. And finally, we
show that depending on the amount of noise, this measurement operator is either proportional to
the identity, or proportional to a rank one projector.
First, we prove a property of the function B(M) for a composition of two measurements.
Intuitively, the following statement uses the fact that if we choose one measurement with probability
α and another measurement with probability β our average success probability is the average of
the success probabilities obtained via the individual measurements:
Claim 1 Let F = {Fk}fk=1 and G = {Gk}f+gk=f+1 be two measurements. Then, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and a
combined measurement M = αF + (1− α)G := {√αFk}fk=1 ∪ {
√
1− αGk}f+gk=f+1, we have
B(αF + (1− α)G) = αB(F ) + (1− α) B(G) .
Proof. Let F = {Fk}fk=1 and G = {Gk}gk=1 be measurements, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and let M : =
{√αFk}fk=1 ∪ {
√
1− αGk}f+gk=f+1.
It is easy to verify that we have the following relations for 1 ≤ k ≤ f : pMxθk = αpFxθk, pMx|θk =
αpFxθk
αpFθk
= pFx|θk, p
M
k|xθ = αp
F
k|xθ and ρ
k,M
xθ =
αFkρxθF
†
k
pM
k|xθ
= FkρxθF
†
k
pF
k|xθ
= ρk,Fxθ and analogously for f + 1 ≤
k ≤ f + g.
We consider the three summands in Eq. (20) separately. For the first term we get
H(X|ΘK)M =
∑
θk
pMθkh
(
pM0|θk
)
=
∑
θ
f∑
k=1
αpFθkh
(
pF0|θk
)
+
∑
θ
f+g∑
k=f+1
(1− α)pGθkh
(
pG0|θk
)
= αH(X|ΘK)F + (1− α) H(X|ΘK)G .
For the second term, we obtain
∑
xθk
pMxθk H
(
N
(
ρk,Mxθ
))
= α
∑
xθ
f∑
k=1
pFxθk H
(
N
(
ρk,Fxθ
))
+ (1− α)
∑
xθ
f+g∑
k=f+1
pGxθk H
(
N
(
ρk,Gxθ
))
.
The third term yields∑
θk
pMθk H
(∑
x
pMx|θkN
(
ρk,Mxθ
))
= α
∑
θ
f∑
k=1
pFθk H
(∑
x
pFx|θkN
(
ρk,Fxθ
))
+ (1− α)
∑
θ
f+g∑
k=f+1
pGxθk H
(∑
x
pGx|θkN
(
ρk,Gxθ
))
.
2
We can now make a series of observations.
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Claim 2 Let M = {Fk} and G = {id, X, Z,XZ}. Then for all g ∈ G we have B(M) = B(gMg†).
Proof. First of all, note that for all g ∈ G, g can at most exchange the roles of 0 and 1. That is,
we can perform a bit flip before the measurement which we can correct for afterwards by applying
classical post-processing. Furthermore, since g ∈ G is Hermitian and unitary we have
pgMg
†
θk =
1
4
Tr(gFkg†(ρ0θ + ρ1θ)g†F
†
kg) =
1
4
Tr(FkF
†
k ) = p
M
θk ,
and hence there exists a bijection f : {0, 1} → {0, 1} such that
pgMg
†
x|θk = p
M
f(x)|θk .
Again, we consider the three summands in Eq. (20) separately. For the first term, observe that
h(pM0|θk) = h(p
M
1|θk).
H(X|ΘK)gMg† =
∑
θk
pgMg
†
θk h
(
pgMg
†
0|θk
)
=
∑
θk
pMθkh
(
pM0|θk
)
= H(X|ΘK)M .
To analyze the second term, note that we can write
pgMg
†
xθk = p
M
f(x)θk ,
and for depolarizing noise N (UρU †) = UN (ρ)U †, in addition the von Neumann entropy itself
is invariant under unitary operations H(gN (ρ)g†) = H(N (ρ)). Putting everything together, we
obtain ∑
xθk
pgMg
†
xθk H
(
N
(
ρk,gMg
†
xθ
))
=
∑
xθk
pMxθk H
(
N
(
ρk,Mxθ
))
.
By a similar argument, we derive the equality for the third term
∑
θk
pgMg
†
θk H
(∑
x
pgMg
†
x|θk N
(
ρk,gMg
†
xθ
))
=
∑
θk
pMθk H
(∑
x
pMx|θkN
(
ρk,Mxθ
))
.
2
Claim 3 Let G = {id, X, Z,XZ}. There exists a measurement operator F such that the minimum
of B(M) over all measurements M is achieved by a measurement proportional to {gFg† | g ∈ G}.
Proof. Let M = {Fk} be a measurement. Let K = |M | be the number of measurement operators.
Clearly, Mˆ = {Fˆg,k} with
Fˆg,k =
1
2
gFkg
† ,
is also a quantum measurement since
∑
g,k Fˆ
†
g,kFˆg,k = id. It follows from Claims 1 and 2 that
B(M) = B(Mˆ). Define operators
Ng,k =
1√
2Tr(F †kFk)
gFkg
† .
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Note that ∑
g∈G
Ng,k =
1√
2Tr(F †kFk)
∑
u,v∈{0,1}
XuZvF †kFkZ
vXu = id .
(see for example Hayashi [Hay06]). Hence Mk = {Ng,k} is a valid quantum measurement. Now,
note that Mˆ can be obtained from M1, . . . ,MK by averaging. Hence, by Claim 1 we have
B(M) = B(Mˆ) ≥ min
k
B(Mk) .
Let M∗ be the optimal measurement. Clearly, m = B(M∗) ≥ mink B(M∗k ) ≥ m by the above and
Claim 2 from which the present claim follows. 2
Finally, we note that we can restrict ourselves to optimizing over positive semi-definite (and
hence Hermitian) matrices only.
Claim 4 Let F be a measurement operator and MF = {gFg†|g ∈ G} the associated measurement.
Then there exists a Hermitian operator Fˆ such that B(MF ) = B(M Fˆ ).
Proof. Let F † = FˆU be the polar decomposition of F †, where Fˆ is positive semi-definite and U
is unitary [HJ85, Corollary 7.3.3]. Evidently, since the trace is cyclic, all probabilities remain the
same. Using the invariance of the von Neumann entropy and the depolarizing quantum operation
under unitaries, the claim follows. 2
Note that Claim 3 also gives us that we have at most 4 measurement operators. Wlog, we
take the measurement outcomes to be labeled 1, 2, 3, 4 and measurement operators F1 = F, F2 =
XFX,F3 = ZFZ,F4 = XZFZX. Our final observation is the following easy claim.
Claim 5 For any linear operator F on Hilbert space H and any state |φ〉 ∈ H such that F |φ〉 6= 0,
it holds that the operator P := F |φ〉〈φ|F
†
Tr(F |φ〉〈φ|F †) is a projector with rank(P ) = 1.
Proof. Notice that |φ〉〈φ|F †F |φ〉〈φ| = Tr(F |φ〉〈φ|F †)|φ〉〈φ|. Thus
PP =
F |φ〉〈φ|F †F |φ〉〈φ|F †
Tr(F |φ〉〈φ|F †)2 =
F |φ〉〈φ|F †
Tr(F |φ〉〈φ|F †) = P .
As F |φ〉 6= 0 we have that rank(F |φ〉〈φ|F †) = 1. 2
Exploiting our observations, we can considerably simplify the expression B(M) to be minimized:
Lemma B.2 Let B(M) be defined as above. Then
min
M
B(M) = min
F
C(F ),
where the minimization is taken over Hermitian operators F ∈ C2×2 and C(F ) is defined as
C(F ) =
1
2
(h (2 Tr (Fρ0+F )) + h (2 Tr (Fρ0×F ))) + h
(
1 + r
2
)
−H (N (2F 2)) . (21)
30
Proof. First of all, note that
pθk = p0θk + p1θk =
1
4
Tr (Fk (ρ0θ + ρ1θ)Fk) =
1
4
Tr(F 2) ,
which is independent of k. Thus we have
1
2
= pθ =
4∑
k=1
pθk = Tr(F 2) ,
and hence pθk = 18 . Furthermore, as in the proof of Claim 2, there exists a bijection f : {0, 1} →
{0, 1} such that
px|θk =
pxθk
pθk
=
Tr (FkρxθFk) /4
1/8
= 2 Tr (FkρxθFk) = 2 Tr
(
Fρf(x)θF
)
.
Note again that h(pM0|θk) = h(p
M
1|θk). We then obtain for the first term
H(X|ΘK) =
∑
θk
pθkh(p0|θk)
=
∑
θk
1
8
h(2 Tr(Fkρ0θFk))
=
1
2
(h(2 Tr(Fρ0+F )) + h(2 Tr(Fρ0×F ))) .
For the second term, we need to evaluate H(N (ρkxθ)). It follows from Claim 5 that if pxθk > 0,
the normalized post-measurement state ρkxθ has eigenvalues 0 and 1. Applying the depolarizing
quantum operation to such rank 1 state gives an entropy H(N (ρkxθ)) = h((1 + r)/2), independent
of the state. Thus the second term becomes∑
xθk
pxθk H
(
N
(
ρkxθ
))
=
∑
xθk
pxθkh
(
1 + r
2
)
= h
(
1 + r
2
)
.
For the third term, we use that for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, it holds that N (αρ+ (1− α)σ) = αN (ρ) + (1−
α)N (σ). Hence,
p0|θkN
(
ρk0θ
)
+ p1|θkN
(
ρk1θ
)
= N
(
p0|θkρk0θ + p1|θkρ
k
1θ
)
= N
2 Tr(Fkρ0θF †k) Fkρ0θF †k
Tr
(
Fkρ0θF
†
k
) + 2 Tr(Fkρ1θF †k) Fkρ1θF †k
Tr
(
Fkρ1θF
†
k
)

= N
(
2Fk(ρ0θ + ρ1θ)F
†
k
)
= UkN
(
2F 2
)
U †k ,
where Uk ∈ G. The third term then yields∑
θk
pθk H
(∑
x
px|θkN
(
ρkxθ
))
= H
(N (2F 2)) .
These arguments prove the Lemma. 2
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B.3 F is Diagonal in the Computational Basis
Now that we have simplified our problem considerably, we are ready to perform the actual opti-
mization. We first show that we can take F to be diagonal in the computational (or Hadamard)
basis.
Claim 6 Let F ∈ C2×2 be the Hermitian operator that minimizes C(F ) as defined by Eq. (21).
Then F = α|φ〉〈φ| + β (id − |φ〉〈φ|) for some α, β ∈ R and pure state |φ〉 lying in the XZ plane of
the Bloch sphere. (i.e. Tr(FY ) = 0).
Proof. Since F is a Hermitian on a 2-dimensional space, we may express F as
F = α|φ〉〈φ|+ β|φ⊥〉〈φ⊥| ,
for some state |φ〉 and real numbers α, β. We first of all note that from ∑k FkFk = id, we obtain
that ∑
k
Tr(FkFk) =
∑
g∈{id,X,Z,XZ}
Tr(gFgg†Fg†) = 4 Tr(F 2) = Tr(id) = 2 ,
and hence Tr(F 2) = α2 + β2 = 1/2. Furthermore, using that |φ〉〈φ|+ |φ⊥〉〈φ⊥| = id gives
F = α|φ〉〈φ|+ β (id− |φ〉〈φ|) , (22)
with β =
√
1/2− α2. Hence without loss of generality, we can consider 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/√2. The
eigenvalues of 2F 2 are 2α2 and 1 − 2α2. Hence, the third term of C(F ) becomes H(N (2F 2)) =
h(2rα2 + (1− r)/2) which does not depend on |φ〉. We want to minimize
min
F
1
2
(h(2 Tr(Fρ0+F )) + h(2 Tr(Fρ0×F ))) + h((1 + r)/2)− h(2rα2 + (1− r)/2) . (23)
We first parametrize the state |φ〉 in terms of its Bloch vector
|φ〉〈φ| = id + xˆX + yˆY + zˆZ
2
.
Since |φ〉 is pure we can write yˆ = √1− xˆ2 − zˆ2. Note that we may wlog assume that 0 ≤ xˆ, zˆ ≤ 1,
since the remaining three measurement operators are given by XFX, ZFZ, and XZFZX. A small
calculation shows that for the encoded bit x ∈ {0, 1}
2 Tr (Fρx+F ) =
1
2
(
1 + (−1)x(4α2 − 1)zˆ) ,
and similarly
2 Tr (Fρx×F ) =
1
2
(
1 + (−1)x(4α2 − 1)xˆ) .
Our goal is to show that for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/√2, the function
f(zˆ) := h(2 Tr(Fρx+F ))
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is non-increasing on the interval 0 ≤ zˆ ≤ 1. First of all, note that f(zˆ) = 1 for α = 1/2. We
now consider the case of α 6= 1/2. A simple computation (using Mathematica) shows that when
differentiating f with respect to zˆ we obtain
f ′(zˆ) =
∂
∂xˆ
f(zˆ) =
1
2
(1− 4α2) log
(
2
1 + zˆ − 4α2zˆ − 1
)
,
f ′′(zˆ) =
∂2
∂xˆ
f(zˆ) =
(1− 4α2)2
ln 2(zˆ2(1− 4α2)2 − 1)
Hence the function has one maximum at zˆ = 0 with f(0) = 1. Since 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/√2 and α 6= 1/2
we also have that (1 − 4α2)2 ≤ 1 and hence f ′′(zˆ) ≤ 0 everywhere and f is concave (though not
strictly concave). Thus f(zˆ) is decreasing with zˆ.
Since we have xˆ2 + zˆ2 + yˆ2 = 1 we can thus conclude that in order to minimize C(F ), we want
to choose xˆ and zˆ as large as possible and thus let yˆ = 0 from which the claim follows. 2
We can immediately extend this analysis to find
Claim 7 Let F be the operator that minimizes C(F ), and write F as in Eq. 22. Then
|φ〉 = g|0〉 ,
for some g ∈ {id, X, Z,XZ}.
Proof. By Claim 6, we can rewrite our optimization problem as
minimize (f(xˆ) + f(zˆ))/2 + h((1 + r)/2)− h(2rα2 + (1− r)/2)
subject to xˆ2 + zˆ2 = 1
0 ≤ xˆ ≤ 1
0 ≤ zˆ ≤ 1 .
By using Lagrange multipliers we can see that for an extreme point we must have either xˆ = zˆ =
1/
√
2 or xˆ = 0, zˆ = 1 or zˆ = 0, xˆ = 1. From the definition of f above we can see that to minimize
the expression, we want to choose the latter, from which the claim follows. 2
B.4 Optimality of the Trivial Strategies
We have shown that without loss of generality F is diagonal in the computational basis. Hence, we
have only a single parameter left in our optimization problem. We must optimize over all operators
F of the form
F = α|φ〉〈φ|+
√
1/2− α2|φ⊥〉〈φ⊥| ,
where we may take |φ〉 to be |0〉 or |1〉. Our aim is to show that either F is the identity, or F = |φ〉〈φ|
depending on the value of r.
Claim 8 Let F be the operator that minimizes C(F ), and let r0 := 2h−1
(
1
2
) − 1. Then F = c id
(for some c ∈ R) for r ≥ r0, and F = |φ〉〈φ| for r < r0, where
|φ〉 = g|0〉 ,
for some g ∈ {id, X, Z,XZ}.
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Proof. We can plug x = 0 and z = 1 in the expressions in the proof of our previous claim. Thus
our goal is to minimize
t(r, α) :=
1
2
(1 + g(1, α)) + h
(
1 + r
2
)
− g(r, α) ,
where
g(r, α) := h
(
1 + r
2
− 2α2r
)
.
Differentiating g with respect to α gives us
∂
∂α
g(r, α) = 4αr
(
log
(
1 + r
2
− 2α2r
)
− log
(
1− r
2
+ 2α2r
))
,
with which we can easily differentiate t with respect to α as
∂
∂α
t(r, α) =
1
2
∂
∂α
g(1, α)− ∂
∂α
g(r, α) .
We can calculate
lim
α→0
∂
∂α
t(r, α) = 0
and
∂
∂α
t(r, 1/2) = 0 .
We thus have two extremal points. By computing the second derivative which is equal to 8(2r2 −
1)/ ln 2 at the point α = 1/2, we can see that as r grows from 0 to 1, the second extreme point
switches from a maximum to a minimum at r = 1/
√
2. Our goal is thus to determine for which r
we have
t(r, 0) ≤ t(r, 1/2) .
Note that shortly after the transition point r = 1/
√
2, we do obtain two additional maxima, but
since we are interested in finding the minimum they do not contribute to our analysis. By plugging
in the definition for t from above, we have that t(r, 0) ≤ t(r, 1/2) iff
1
2
≤ h
(
1 + r
2
)
,
or in other words iff
2h−1
(
1
2
)
− 1 ≤ r ,
as promised. 2
We conclude that Bob’s optimal strategy, –the one which minimizes H(X|ΘKE)–, is an ex-
tremal strategy, that is, he either measures his qubit in the computational basis, or he stores the
qubit as is. This is the content of Theorem 5.1. We believe that a similar analysis can be done for
the dephasing quantum operation, by first symmetrizing the noise by applying a rotation over pi/4
to the input states.
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